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Abstract—Additive manufacturing (AM), or 3D printing, is
an emerging manufacturing technology that is expected to
have far-reaching socioeconomic, environmental, and geopo-
litical implications. As use of this technology increases, it will
become more common to produce functional parts, including
components for safety-critical systems. AM’s dependence on
computerization raises the concern that the manufactured
part’s quality can be compromised by sabotage.
This paper demonstrates the validity of this concern, as
we present the very first full chain of attack involving AM,
beginning with a cyber attack aimed at compromising a benign
AM component, continuing with malicious modification of a
manufactured object’s blueprint, leading to the sabotage of the
manufactured functional part, and resulting in the physical
destruction of a cyber-physical system that employs this part.
The contributions of this paper are as follows. We propose
a systematic approach to identify opportunities for an attack
involving AM that enables an adversary to achieve his/her
goals. Then we propose a methodology to assess the level of
difficulty of an attack, thus enabling differentiation between
possible attack chains. Finally, to demonstrate the experimental
proof for the entire attack chain, we sabotage the 3D printed
propeller of a quadcopter UAV, causing the quadcopter to
literally fall from the sky.
1. Introduction
Additive Manufacturing (AM), often called 3D printing,
refers to the creation of 3D objects by adding thin lay-
ers, one layer at a time, to build up an object from two
dimensions to three in order to create the desired form.
Compared to the traditional “subtractive manufacturing”
technologies, which use various cutting tools to reduce a
solid block of source material to the desired shape and
size, AM has numerous socioeconomic, environmental, and
technical advantages. These include, but are not limited to,
shorter design-to-product time, just-in-time and on-demand
production, production in the proximity to assembly lines,
reduction of source material waste, and especially, the ability
to produce functional parts with complex internal structure
and application area-optimized physical properties. These
advantages have played a significant role in the increased
adoption of this transformative technology in the recent
years. According to the Wohlers report [1], in 2015 the AM
industry accounted for $5.165 billion of revenue, with 32.5%
of all AM-generated objects used as functional parts.
Due to the computerization involved in AM, several
researchers have raised concerns regarding its security, in-
cluding intellectual property violation [2], [3], [4], [5], [6],
[7], [8] and sabotage of manufactured object’s quality [9],
[10], [11], [12], [13], [14]. In this paper, we focus on
the latter – a threat to public safety and national security
when functional parts of safety-critical systems or of critical
infrastructure are sabotaged. While prior work addresses
various selected aspects of this issue, to the best of our
knowledge, no one has provided a holistic view and pre-
sented a proof that this type of indirect, multistage, cyber-
physical attack is actually possible. This paper provides
such a proof. This paper presents the complete chain of
attack involving AM, beginning with a cyber attack aimed
at compromising a component in the AM environment,
continuing with malicious modification of a design file,
leading to the manufacture of a sabotaged functional part,
and resulting in the physical destruction of a cyber-physical
system that employs this part. In order to accomplish this,
we propose a systematic approach to identify possible attack
chains that will allow an adversary to achieve his/her goals.
For the selection of the attack to be performed, we propose
a methodology to assess the level of difficulty of an attack.
The assessment is based on the skills, tools, and network
access available to an adversary.
Lastly, for the experimental evaluation of both our ap-
proach and the concern raised, we demonstrate an attack
on a benign desktop 3D printer owner who prints a re-
placement propeller for his quadcopter UAV. Our remote
sabotage attack causes the propeller to break during flight,
and this is quite literally followed by the quadcopter falling
from the sky. The remainder of the paper is structured as
follows: In Section 2, we discuss the previous work in
this area. Section 3 contains an overview of the Additive
Manufacturing workflow which will be the basis of the rest
of the study. Section 4 maps the attack chain what will lead
to sabotage of a system by compromising a 3D printed func-
tional part. We discuss the flow of the attack, tracing back
from adversary goals, to various forms of manipulations,
to possible compromised elements and attack vectors. In
Section 5, we rank the difficulty level and impact of each
attack vector by methodically deconstructing and assessing
the factors involved in carrying out the attacks. Then, in
Sections 6 and 7 we demonstrate an end-to-end cyber attack
utilizing the methodology that we’ve presented and the real-
life implications of this attack. Finally, we summarize our
findings and discuss future work in Section 8.
2. Related Work
To the best of our knowledge, the very first proof of the
concept that a desktop 3D printer could be compromised
was presented in 2013 at the XCon2013 conference by
Xiao Zi Hang (Claud Xiao). According to his keynote
presentation [15], an attack can modify “printing results,”
including the size of the model, position of components,
integrability of components, etc.
Several publications analyze the possibility of compro-
mising 3D printers. In [12], the authors analyzed the man-
ufacturing process chain and found several attack vectors
that can be easily exploited. They focused primary on the
aspects related to networks and communication. They have
examined the lack of integrity checks, particularly at the
stage of receiving the design (common mechanisms that
are not secure include email and USB drives), the lack of
physical security on machining tools, the exposure to com-
mon network attacks and the difficulty of relying on existing
quality control processes. A recent publication [16] analyzes
open source software that is commonly used with desktop
3D printers: Marlin firmware, and three GUI applications
that run on PCs and communicate with the 3D printer via
G-code, Cura 3D, ReplicatorG, and Repetier-Host. In each
of these programs, static analysis of the source code and
dynamic analysis of the communication between the 3D
printer and the computer reveal numerous vulnerabilities that
can be exploited.
Other publications dealing with this topic can be grouped
based on the two main security threat categories associated
with AM: intellectual property (IP) violation and sabotage
of AM.
Several authors [2], [4], [8] analyze legal aspects of IP
protection in AM and report numerous deficits. For instance,
a 3D scan of a manufactured object is not considered an
original technical drawing (blueprint) [8]; thus it can be used
to legally avoid copyright protection of a blueprint.
In [6] the authors present the first published side-channel
attack on a 3D printer. The authors analyze the acoustic
emanations of a desktop 3D printer, and show that various
sound properties can be used to distinguish between four
stepper motors, three of which are used to move the printer
nozzle along the X/Y/Z axes, while the other is used to ex-
trude the filament while printing. The authors show that this
information is sufficient to reconstruct object topology. The
experimental results show an average rate of accuracy for
axis prediction of 78.35% and an average length prediction
error of 17.82%.
Several authors have addressed various aspects of IP
protection of 3D object design. In [5], the authors survey 3D
digital watermarking techniques and evaluate the potential
of these techniques to withstand shape perturbations, e.g.,
the intentional alterations or unintentional noise commonly
introduced during reverse engineering. This property is
necessary to trace the origin of the IP violation. In [17],
the authors propose a signing methodology that aims to
transition the metadata associated with the digital 3D object
to the physical 3D printed object. The authors also suggest
a variety of approaches to maintain provenance, including
steganography, digital watermarking, content streaming and
RFID hardware. Among others, the authors discuss the
benefits of printing RFID tags inside the 3D objects as a
way to track the objects.
However, as discussed in [3], in the context of AM, IP
is not limited to the specification of the 3D object geometry;
it can also include the specification of required properties
(that correspond to operational parameters of a functional
part), and manufacturing process parameters (which ensure
that functional parts will satisfy requirements). We are not
aware of any further publications addressing the latter two
categories of IP in AM.
A recent article [13] generalizes the ability to sabotage
AM as the weaponization of 3D printing. The authors
propose a framework for the analysis of attacks involving
AM and then then discuss how certain categories of attacks
can generate effects comparable with those produced by
weapons (e.g., kinetic damage). Further, the authors argue
that the targets of such an attack can be 3D manufactured
objects, AM equipment, or environment.
In [11], based on an extensive survey of AM-related
material science literature, the authors identified manufac-
turing parameters that can have a negative impact on a
manufactured part’s quality. The discussion focuses on AM
with metals and alloys and covers a variety of AM processes,
including powder bed fusion, direct energy deposition, and
sheet lamination. The identified parameters include but are
not limited to build direction, scanning strategy, heat source
energy, etc.
For plastics 3D printers, several publications provide an
experimental proof that various manipulations can reduce
the part’s quality. In [9], the authors developed malware
to alter the STL file defining the 3D object geometry by
introducing voids (i.e., internal cavities) into the design. A
similar approach is presented in a recent article [14]; here,
the authors investigated the impact on the tensile strength
of two types of manufacturing modifications: insertion of
sub-millimeter scale defects in the interior of 3D printed
parts, and modification of the orientation of the part during
printing. As opposed to [9], in [14] defects are introduced
by replacing the main material with a contaminant.
3. Additive Manufacturing Workflow
Figure 1 represents a high abstraction level workflow
that is common in AM. This workflow represents an increas-
ingly common scenario when AM is offered as a service1.
1. As of May 2016, 3D Printing Businesses web site
(http://3dprintingbusiness.directory/) lists 851 companies offering 3D
printing service.
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Figure 1. Additive Manufacturing Workflow
Multiple actors, the majority of whom represent enterprises,
are involved in AM and provide/consume different services.
AM equipment (frequently associated with, but not lim-
ited to the actual “3D printer”) is usually developed and
provided by an original equipment manufacturer (OEM)2.
The firmware and software updates (for AM equipment and
the Controller PC, respectively) that extend functionality
and fix bugs are provided by the OEM or companies that
develop commercial software. For the desktop 3D printers,
open-source software developed by the 3D manufacturers
community is frequently used.
It is important to note that, for the equipment main-
tenance and repair (not shown in the figure), various me-
chanical, electrical, and electronic components (e.g., motors,
filters, etc.) might be required. These items are sold by OEM
or third-party companies, and shipped via physical carriers.
The blueprint of a 3D object is provided either in STere-
oLithography (STL)3 [18] or in Additive Manufacturing
File (AMF) format [19], [20], both of which represent the
Computer-Aided Design (CAD) model of the 3D object to
be manufactured. The figure depicts a scenario in which
object blueprints (in STL/AMF files) are provided by exter-
nal 3D object designers directly to the AM service provider.
Another common scenario is when the design is provided by
the end product customer, who either designed the proposed
object (common for enterprise customers) or bought the
design/blueprint from a designer (increasingly common for
individual consumers).
At the AM service provider site, a STL/AMF file can
be either be directly transferred to a 3D printer (e.g., via
computer network or USB stick) or interpreted by the
controller PC. In the latter case, the controller PC sends
the 3D printer either individual control commands (in some
cases encoded in “G-code” [21], a language commonly used
in Computer-Aided Manufacturing, CAM4), or as a tool
2. In 2015, 62 system manufacturers in 20 countries produced and sold
industrial-grade AM equipment and it is estimated that hundreds of small
companies offer desktop 3D printers [1].
3. The abbreviation STL is overloaded with several backronyms, includ-
ing but not limited to Standard Tesselation Language, Surface Tesselation
Language, etc.
4. CAM is frequently referred to as Cybermanufacturing.
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Figure 2. Attack on/with 3D printer (based on [13])
path file containing a sequence of (3D printer-specific, often
proprietary) commands to be executed [9]. The transmission
commonly utilizes a computer network5.
For the actual manufacturing, AM equipment requires
electricity, and a variety of source and eventually also
auxiliary materials. While source materials are included in
the end-product, auxiliary materials have different functions,
supporting or enabling production. For instance, support
structure enables the printing of complex geometries; If
lasers are used as a heat source, inert gas (usually, argon)
is often used, etc. Currently, the source materials for plastic
printers are commonly supplied by the OEMs; the source
material market for metal printers is less restrictive [1].
Depending on the AM process, the source material, and
the part geometry, the production workflow can include
several post-processing steps (not shown in the figure).
These typically include removal of support structures used
in the production of 3D objects with complex geometry. For
metal parts, hot isostatic pressing (HIP), finish machining,
and surface finishing are common post-processing steps. In
the case of functional parts, non-destructive testing (e.g.,
ultrasonic C-scan) is usually employed as the final step.
Only after all necessary production and post-production
steps are accomplished, is the manufactured 3D object is
delivered to the customer via a physical carrier.
In order to reduce environmental impact and manufac-
turing costs, the remaining source material can be partially
recycled. This is especially the case in power bed fusion6
(PBF), an AM process that can be used for both metals and
plastics. The reused powder is often sieved and mixed with
“virgin” powder in proportions that minimize the negative
impact on the part’s quality to an acceptable level7.
4. Attack Chain
Figure 2 outlines how attacks on or with AM can be
performed. A variety of attack vectors can be used to
compromise one or more elements of the AM workflow.
The compromised element(s), their roles in the workflow,
and the degree to which an adversary can control these
5. In the case of desktop printers, USB connection is common.
6. In the PBF processes, a thin layer of the source material (usually,
metal or polymer) in powder form is distributed in a powder bed. That
layer is fused by a heat source (either laser or electron beam) that melts
the profile of the next slice of the 3D object. The powder distribution and
fusion sequence is repeated layer by layer.
7. Due to the exposure of the unused powder to high temperatures, the
properties of particles can change (in the case of plastic) and/or powder
particles can agglomerate into large clusters. Both can have a negative
effect on the final product quality.
element(s) determine the kind of manipulations an adversary
can perform. In conjunction with the type of AM equipment,
source materials, and the application area of the manu-
factured part, these manipulations determine the potential
effects. Only a subset of the resulting effects may intersect
with the adversarial goals. In what follows, we refer to this
intersection as attack targets or threats.
In this section we use the framework depicted in Figure 2
for the identification of possible attacks involving AM.
Inspired by attack trees [22], we begin with the achievable
adversarial goals (or attack targets), followed by a discussion
of the manipulations that are needed to achieve these goals,
and then we discuss which elements in the AM workflow
can exercise the manipulations listed, and finally address
attack vectors that enable these elements to be compromised.
The outcome of the analysis presented in this section is
summarized in Figure 3.
4.1. Adversarial Goals
From the AM security threats identified in the research
literature (see Section 2), in this paper we consider only an
intentional sabotage of a 3D-printed functional part in this
study.
Sabotage of Manufactured Part: Functional parts are
typically designed to maintain specified operational
conditions for an extended period of time. We can
distinguish between two cases of sabotage. In the first,
the part can be altered in such a way that the normal
operational range exceeds its (altered) strength, thus
causing the part to break under supposedly normal
operational conditions. Second, the part can be altered
in a way that the material fatigue develops faster
than supposed, thus causing part to break sooner than
expected under normal operational conditions.
4.2. Manipulations
The stated goal of a manufactured part’s sabotage can be
achieved via various manipulations. In this paper, we only
consider manipulations that can be executed in the cyber
domain. Manipulations are represented by Influences and
Influenced elements. Influenced elements describe the object
that is manipulated by an attack and Influences describe the
modification that is done of the Influenced element.
Until now, the research literature has identified the
following two major categories of manipulations that can
influence an AM-generated part’s quality: modification of
the object’s specification and manipulation of the manufac-
turing process. We discuss the Influences and the Influenced
elements that are involved in those manipulations.
We further restrict our considerations to the operational
phase of the manufacturing life cycle.
4.2.1. Influences.
Object Specification Modification: Object’s specification
describes the object’s geometry, orientation, and ulti-
mately its material; the latter is only relevant for multi-
material AM equipment. It should be noted that the
object specification can have various representations,
based on the “location” in the AM workflow (see
Figure 1). It is commonly associated with the STL or
AMF files, both of which are CAD formats, but it can
also be represented within a toolpath file or as a series
of individual G-code commands, etc.
Defects: It is obvious that the object’s geometry and
material impact its mechanical properties. Changing
exterior shape can affect a part’s integrability in a
system and eventually detected by visual inspection.
Several researchers have proposed the use of internal
defects as a means of sabotage [9], [11], [14]. The
negative impact of internal voids (i.e., cavities) and
a contaminant material defects on mechanical prop-
erties have been demonstrated experimentally in [9]
and [14], respectively. Further, as noted in [11], this
kind of attack will eventually affect the part’s weight
and weight distribution – properties that can impact
the performance of the system employing such a part.
Orientation: In the material science, it is very well
known that anisotropy8 of 3D-printed parts is fun-
damental in several AM processes [23], [24]. Based
on this property, researches have proposed chang-
ing the built direction as a means of sabotaging a
manufactured part’s mechanical properties [11]. An
experimental proof of this attack was recently shown
in [14].
Manufacturing Process Manipulation: As opposed to the
traditional subtractive manufacturing, AM not only
defines the manufactured object’s geometry but also
“creates” its material. Various parameters of an AM
manufacturing process9 influence the microstructure of
the created material, thus defining its physical proper-
ties. This aspect has been intensively investigated in the
material sciences from the quality assurance perspec-
tive [25], [26]. For metals and alloys, a qualitative anal-
ysis of manufacturing parameters manipulations that
can be used to sabotage a part’s quality was presented
in [11]. Parameters like layer thickness, scanning strat-
egy, heat source energy, etc. have been identified as
potential subjects of malicious manipulations. In the
case of fused deposition modeling (FDM), an AM
technology that is popular with desktop 3D printers
(and that we will use in the case study in Sections 6
and 7), parameters like nozzle temperature, print bed
temperature, filament extrusion speed, distance between
extruder and the printed object, etc. can be manip-
ulated. All these can eventually have an impact on
the strength of bonding between layers, thus impacting
the part’s mechanical properties. The effects of some
of these manufacturing parameters manipulations have
been shown in [27].
8. Anisotropy means that properties vary in different directions; in the
discussed case, mechanical properties like tensile strength are meant.
9. These parameters and the impact of their manipulation vary greatly
across different AM technologies.
Figure 3. Attack Flow
4.2.2. Influenced Elements.
AM Files: AM files are the input to the manufacturing
process. STL/AMF files contain object’s specification
and any modification to these files will directly influ-
ence the resulting object. Printer instructions, that are
generated from these design files, are compiled into
a toolpath file that can be changed on the Controller
PC, during transit or even on the 3D printer. The
printer’s instructions in the toolpath (commonly G-code
commands) represent object’s specification as well as
manufacturing properties that are related to the printing
process.
Configuration: Minor changes in configurations can im-
pact the resulting object. Crucial properties of object’s
specification can be manipulated by minor changes in
configuration settings in the slicing software. Properties
like layer thickness, fill density, shell thickness, etc.
Additionally, modification of printer configuration, like
print bed temperature, nozzle travel speed, etc, can
impact the manufacturing process.
Code: Controlling the software enables a fine-grain control
over the outcome. By influencing the software that runs
on the Controller PC or on the 3D printer, the adversary
can achieve both manipulation categories.
Traffic: Controlling the traffic can cause interference with
the times or content of the sent data. Some printers
receive the printing instructions over the network and
any disturbance or modification to this data impacts the
resulting object. In [26], the authors show that even
slight printing delays between each printed layer can
affect the compressive strength, toughness and tangent
modulus of samples printed.
4.2.3. Characteristics of Manipulations. Orthogonal to the
presented categories of manipulations are characteristics of
these manipulations. These depend on the subject of manip-
ulation and also on the compromised element that exercises
the change (we will discuss the latter in Section 4.3). We
propose the following categorization:
Indiscriminate/Selective: Manipulations such as change of
the object’s orientation are rather indiscriminate and af-
fect the entire object. Similarly, configuration variables
that determine the slicing tool’s properties will lead to
rather indiscriminate changes that affect the processing
of the entire design file. Other manipulations can be
selective, depending on both the subject of manipula-
tion and the compromised element that exercises this
manipulation. For example, layer thickness can either
be modified in the slicing software configuration and
indiscriminately impact all the layers of the printed
object or modified by changing a subset of G-code
commands, impacting only selected layers during the
manufacturing process.
Static/Dynamic: Another characteristics is whether manip-
ulations are statically present or dynamically intro-
duced. For instance, modifications of STL/AMF files
are generally static in nature, and they will be repli-
cated every time the file is used to manufacture the
described object. Compromise of software or firmware
involved into AM processes will enable dynamic ma-
nipulations. Modifications to the toolpath or G-code
commands10 can then be performed dynamically “on
the fly” and triggered by a combination of various
events. As demonstrated by the Stuxnet attack [28]
has illustrated, dynamic attacks can be significantly
harder to identify as an attack; therefore, such attacks
can continue being active for a longer period of time
undetected.
Direct/Indirect: In object specification manipulations (e.g.,
in the STL/AMF file), the configuration values of the
10. Both toolpath and G-code commends can contain/specify information
about the manufactured object as well as instructions for the 3D printer
configuration; the latter will affect manufacturing process.
AM tools’ and 3D printer’s, instructions sent to the
3D printer (e.g., as individual G-code commands), and
status information sent back directly affect the manu-
factured object (and its quality) directly. In addition,
as discussed in [26], [29], also the timing of particular
commands and status information, as well as the power
supply of the 3D printer, can have a significant impact
on the manufactured process, and therefore on the
manufacturing part’s quality. Various classical network
attacks (DoS, etc). can cause indirect manipulations,
e.g., by causing G-code commands to arrive too late
or out of order. It should be noted that while the
impact of direct manipulations on a part’s quality can
be predicted with a high level of certainty (and/or tested
in a laboratory environment), the impact of indirect
manipulations is rather stochastic.
4.3. Compromised Elements
The above mentioned manipulations are only possible if
at least one of the following elements of the AM workflow is
compromised. Note that not all compromised elements can
exercise all manipulations, and that manipulations available
to different compromised elements might be comprised of
different characteristics.
External Designer: In the considered AM workflow, the
STL/AMF blueprint files are provided to the AM Ser-
vice Provider either by external designers or down-
loaded from the Internet. In both cases, the files are
received via an external (Internet) connection and serve
as the basis for the entire manufacturing process. The
designer is likely located outside the trusted environ-
ment; and can therefore be compromised either by a
cyber attack or impersonation of a malicious actor.
In this case, the STL/AMF files originating outside
the trusted environment may contain an altered object
design, and both the introduction of defects and change
of the orientation are possible. This represents a direct,
static manipulation; whether it can be selective or not
depends on the file format used.
Controller PC: The Controller PC operates on the
STL/AMF design files, converts the design to G-code
command and issues corresponding those commands
to the 3D printer. If the Controller PC is not dedicated
solely to the AM process and is also used for unrelated
activities such as web browsing, etc. (as is commonly
the case of private PCs connected to a desktop 3D
printers, and cannot be completely excluded in an
industrial environment either), it can be compromised.
Exploitation of the Controller PC can target software
that is either directly related to the AM process, e.g.,
tools that are supporting the AM process, or unrelated
software components that are executed on the Con-
troller PC. If malicious code is running on the PC, it
has direct access to, and therefore can manipulate, the
design files, the generated tool path files, individual
G-code commands, the 3D printer configuration, and
ultimately also firmware updates for 3D printer.
Network: In the AM workflow, network communication is
present for transferring files from an external designer
of a 3D object to the Controller PC (external network
communication) and also between the Controller PC
and the 3D printer (internal network communication).
Both can be compromised, enabling changes of the
transmitted data.
We distinguish between the following network ele-
ments that can be compromised:
Network Equipment: Both the hardware and soft-
ware of network equipment such as routers, switches,
hubs, etc. can be compromised.
Network Services: Network communication is sup-
ported by various services including DNS, Active
Directory, Mail servers, etc. Compromise of such
elements can control the flow and the access on the
network.
Unrelated assets: Other computers, network-enabled
devices such as printers, and mobile devices that
have access to the network can be compromised,
thus enabling malicious interference into other com-
ponents involved in the 3D printing process.
Depending on whether the external or internal network
connection is compromised, a variety of manipulations
can occur, however they cannot exceed the scope of
manipulations available to the external 3D Object De-
signer or Controller PC, respectively. These manipula-
tions can be further restricted, depending on which the
network element that is compromised.
3D Printer: The 3D printer is the heart of the manufactur-
ing process. Control over the printer can compromise
the integrity of the printed object’s design and manu-
facturing process. The attacker needs to control either
the 3D printer’s firmware or the hardware to achieve
his/her goals. If the 3D Printer is compromised, the
whole spectrum of manipulations is possible without
any restrictions11.
4.4. Attack Vectors
An attack vector is a path or means by which an attacker
can compromise and thus gain control over an element in
the AM workflow. In this paper, we only consider cyber
attack vectors that can be used to compromise one or more
of the elements described above. We distinguish between
the following attack vectors:
4.4.1. Software Attacks. The Software that is used on the
Controller PC or the 3D printer can be compromised and
execute additional unintended functions.
It has been well demonstrated that programs are full of
vulnerabilities and are vulnerable to arbitrary code execu-
tion. According to [30], the defect per KLOC stands at 6.1
for examined mission-critical software systems that were
examined. Also, the Time-to-Fix can take days to months.
11. Here, logical restrictions are meant; all manipulations are within the
boundaries of physically possible.
3D printing softwares are no exception. Since there is a
variety of software that is directly or indirectly involved in
the 3D printing process, there is a wide range of potential
software vulnerabilities that can be exploited.
Code Injection into AM Files: We consider the AM de-
sign files the most vulnerable components, because they
generally originate outside the controlled environment
and are generated by tools that are frequently provided
by third parties. The attacker can change the original
design files at several steps of the AM process, starting
with the external designer’s site and the file’s delivery
to the Controller PC, up to its representation in the 3D
printer itself.
If an attacker can find a vulnerability in the software in-
volved in the manufacturing process, a specially crafted
file can be provided as a source for this software, thus
eventually executing an arbitrary code. There are two
types of AM files: the design files and the toolpath
files. Compromising of the design files (commonly
of the STL/AMF type), can be done either from the
external designer side, the Controller PC itself (by
a malicious software already running on the PC or
other compromised network components), or during
the files’ network transmission. A well-known example
of a malicious code embedded in a CAD file is the
MEDRE.A worm [31]. Eventually it is also possible to
compromise the 3D printer itself, e.g., by a specially
crafted toolpath file.
General Infiltration Methods: Software attacks aim to
compromise software running on one of the compro-
mised elements. These attacks frequently exploit soft-
ware vulnerabilities, i.e., weaknesses in the system that
commonly originate from software bugs, specifically
errors, mistakes, or oversights that can result in unex-
pected and typically undesired behavior. Compromise
of a single device in the AM network can lead to
compromise of other crucial components via lateral
movement. An adversary will search for the easiest and
least protected point of entry by leveraging common
infiltration methods such as: spear phishing via emails
or fraudulent websites, malicious attachments, external
devices, brute force hacking, stolen credential, etc.
Software Supply Chain: Software vulnerabilities can be
accidentally or intentionally inserted into the software
at any point in its development, distribution or use pro-
cess. Software end-users have limited ways of finding
and correcting these defects to avoid exploitation.
Compromised Software: Software that is used on the
Controller PC or 3D printer can be compromised
and execute additional unintended functions. Such
functions can compromise either AM-related files or
the communication between AM components. The
attacker can replace the software with its own mali-
cious version or compromise specific libraries.
Software Updates: Software updates are used to fix
bugs that cause operational/security problems or
to add new features/functionality into the program.
Software updates are a potential threat, not only be-
cause of the addition of new code which might con-
tain bugs, but also because the addition of new code
introduces another attack vector to the environment.
Software updates can be hijacked and manipulated
if not implemented correctly. One famous example
is the Flame malware that spoofed the request for
Windows Updates on the local network and delivered
malicious code instead [32].
Open Source Backdoor: An attacker can gain access
to the network by integrating a backdoor into open
source software. This is not a targeted attack since it
is hard to influence the open-source software that
is used. Moreover, the backdoor must escape the
checks and the reviews of the code’s owners of the
code. Nevertheless, since in 3D printing, there is a
variety of open-source malwares used, this attack
vector has a high likelihood of occurring.
4.4.2. Hardware/Firmware Attacks. The focal point of the
AM process is the 3D printer. By controlling the printer,
the adversary can impact the outcome of the manufactur-
ing. Thus the adversary needs to gain control over the
firmware/hardware of the 3D printer in order to fully control
the printing process. Most of the printers are not directly
connected to the Internet, thus the adversary needs to gain a
foothold inside the network and leverage it for a secondary
attack of the 3D equipment.
Firmware/Hardware Vulnerabilities: Similarly to soft-
ware, the existence of bugs or oversights in the
firmware/hardware components is inevitable. They are
less common than software vulnerabilities since the
functionality of the 3D equipment is limited and find-
ing/testing the vulnerabilities requires the hardware
itself or an emulator (which are still not common).
Hardware trojans: Hardware attacks, in the form of mali-
cious modifications of electronic hardware at different
stages of its life cycle, pose major security concerns
in the electronics industry. An adversary can mount
such an attack by introducing a hardware Trojan into
the system, that can manipulate the AM process-related
data it has access to.
Firmware Updates: A malicious firmware update is one
of the ways in which an adversary can compromise a
3D printer or network elements.
4.4.3. Network Attacks. Since the AM equipment can
reside on the same network as the Controller PC, tradi-
tional network attacks can impact the 3D printing process.
Although most printers use propriety protocols, they are
vulnerable to the same attacks as any other network devices.
General Network attacks: Some of the network attacks
lead to full control over the communication. The at-
tacker can secretly relay and possibly alter the com-
munication between two parties. Attacks in which com-
munication is fully controlled are called ”man-in-the-
middle” attacks, and this type of attack can include
sniffing, spoofing and session hijacking. Moreover, an
attacker can cause damages and delays in the manufac-
turing process by triggering a denial-of-service attack
in the network. Such attacks can halt production and
suspend the legitimate communications on the network.
Any interference in the timing of the printing process
can have significant effects on the quality of the result-
ing object [29].
Protocol vulnerabilities: There may be logic bugs in the
protocols themselves. An attacker can hijack a commu-
nication by using logical mistakes in the protocol, as
well as implementation mistakes in the software. These
kinds of bugs can be extremely harmful, since changing
the protocol can be expensive and time-consuming.
One well known oversight is the Transaction ID Guess-
ing attack on the DNS protocol [33].
5. Attack Difficulty Assessment
While in the previous section we have discussed ele-
ments that can lead to a stated goal (sabotage of a man-
ufactured part’s quality), the individual attack paths have
different levels of difficulty; they may vary in the hacking
skills required, AM proficiency, and required access. There-
fore, in this section we assume the adversarial perspective
of an attacker who wants to select a less challenging path
to achieve the stated goal.
In this section we propose a methodology that takes
into account the exploitation difficulty of the attack vector
and the AM proficiency needed, mechanical and/or material
engineering knowledge to determine what manipulation to
induce. We analyze both aspect and correlate them to create
a holistic approach.
For each category, we examine several leading factors
and rank them based on the suggested scale. We then
calculate the final score of each attack vector and manipula-
tion based on the following equation: dPScale ⇤Weighte
where the weights of each factor is the same.
5.1. Attack Vector Exploitation
We examine the technological feasibility of each if the
attack vectors. Since there are multiple factors that can be
taken into consideration, we focus on the most significant
elements to measure exploitation difficulty: the hacking
skills that are needed, the availability of tools and the level
of access to the AM environment. Figure 4 presents the
detailed categorization of each attack vector according to
the exploitation difficulty. The scales are determined in the
following way:
Hacking Skills Level: The skill level needed determines
which attack vectors are more feasible to exploit by a
particular adversary. On a global scale with multiple
adversaries, it also provides an indication of which
attacks are more likely to occur. If the attack requires a
higher level of hacking skills, it is less likely to occur.
The Scale is ranging from 1-3:
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Figure 4. Technological difficulty calculation
1) Low skill level - Attacks that can be executed
using widely available tools and do not require
any reverse engineering skills.
2) Moderate skill level - We consider as moderate
all attacks that require basic reverse engineering
skills. Most of the attack vectors fall into this
category.
3) Advanced skill level - We consider as advanced
all attacks that require advanced hacking and
reverse engineering skills both in software and
hardware.
Level of Access to the AM Environment: This factor
determines the level of access the attacker needs to
gain into the AM environment in order to carry out
each exploitation. Some attacks can be performed
outside the AM network, either from the Internet
or through the external designer’s site, while others
require a foothold inside the network. The Scale is
ranging from 1-3:
1) Attacks that can be carried out from outside of
the AM network.
2) Attacks that need some foothold in the AM
network.
3) Attacks that require a foothold at a specific
element in the AM network.
Availability of Tools: All attacks require specific tools
used for testing and carrying out the attack. The simpler
and more common the tools are, the easier it will be for
the attacker to prepare and execute the attack. There are
two types of tools needed: first, general tools that are
used for hacking and second, target platform oriented
tools that are needed for testing. We are focusing on
the latter. The Scale is ranging from 1-3:
1) Attack vectors that require general tools or
specific AM tools that are widely available on
the Internet.
2) Attack vectors that require a specific version of
software.
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Figure 5. AM Mastery Categorization
3) Attack vectors that require a specific version of
firmware and hardware.
5.2. Definition of Malicious Manipulation
We examine the level of AM proficiency needed in
order to define the manipulation that will lead to the final
goal. We calculate this based of the following factors: pro-
ficiency in the AM process and tools and the Mechanical
engineering and/or Material science knowledge needed to
define a manipulation that is likely to cause the desired
effect. Figure 5 contains a detailed categorization of the
manipulations according to the level of AM proficiency
needed.
The considered factors are:
Proficiency in the AM Process and Tools: In order to
achieve the desired goal, the adversary has to have
some knowledge about the AM process, the tools that
are used, and potentially the specific setup in the vic-
tim’s environment. The Scale is ranging from 1-3:
1) Required basic or no knowledge.
2) Requires moderate knowledge.
3) Required advance knowledge.
Mechanical Engineering/Material Science Knowledge:
In order to determine the application area of the
manipulation, a certain amount of Mechanical
engineering and/or Material science knowledge is
required. The achievable damage can vary per printed
item, destined environment, and the AM equipment.
The Scale is ranging from 1-3:
1) Required basic or no knowledge.
2) Requires moderate knowledge.
3) Required advance knowledge.
5.3. Attack Heat Map
We correlate the attack vectors and the manipulations
that we’ve analyzed and present in Figure 6 the heat map
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Figure 6. Attack Vector and Manipulations Heat Map
of the attacks that aim to damage functioning parts and the
correlating heat map index. The table in the figure combines
all of the previous information into one visual display. For
each cell in the table, we correlate the assessment of the
technological difficulty of the attack vector and the AM
proficiency needed to execute the manipulation, which are
calculated in Figure 4 and Figure 5 respectively. The color
is calculated according to the heat map.
6. Case Study, Part I: Attack Preparation
This Section provides an empirical evidence that it is
possible to cause physical damage of a CPS via sabotage of
its 3D-printed components. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the very first study that shows the entire chain of
attack, beginning with a cyber attack to infiltrate a com-
puter, and leading – over multiple stages – to the physical
destruction of the victim CPS. A video demonstrating the
final stage of attack can be found under [34].
In this section, we first outline the scenario considered
in the case study, provide an analysis of attack options
available to an adversary, and lastly, we present the attack.
6.1. The Scenario
6.1.1. Victim and Adversary. We consider a realistic sce-
nario involving an owner (home user) of a desktop 3D
printer (see Figure 7) who uses this printer to produce
replacement propellers for his quadcopter UAV – a drone
that he flies frequently, sometimes at a high altitude. In order
to produce the propellers the printer owner has procured a
Internet
3D Printer 
Owner
STL/AMF 
Propeller Design
3D Printer
Personal Computer
Source and Auxiliary 
Material Suppliers
3D Object 
Designers
Replacement 
Propeller
Quadcopter UAV
Figure 7. Considered Scenario
corresponding blueprint from a 3D object designer. The 3D
printer is controlled by personal computer that sends the
G-code commands via a USB connection.
This scenario’s workflow is quite similar to the general
AM workflow described earlier (see Figure 1 in Section 3),
with just a few differences which will affect the selection of
available attack vectors discussed later in this section. First,
we assume that the considered 3D printer owner does not
routinely maintains all of his software up-to-date, behavior
which is representative for the majority of private desktop
3D printer owners, who either don’t possesses the necessary
skills, or are very reluctant to apply patches. Second, the
printer owner also uses this PC to surf in the Internet, read
e-mails, download documents, play games, etc.
In this scenario an adversary wants to cause a significant
damage to the victim’s drone. The adversary comes up with
an idea to sabotage the victim’s 3D-printed replacement
propeller. This must be accomplished in such a way that
during installation the propeller’s integration in the drone
is not compromised and that the change made to the re-
placement propeller is subtle enough to pass basic visual
inspection. Furthermore, in the hope that the failure occurs
while the drone reaches high altitude or during ascending at
a high speed, the adversary needs to introduce a defect that
will be time-delayed or triggered under certain operational
conditions, respectively. We assume that the adversary has
basic to average hacking skills but moderate to advanced
AM proficiency. Additionally, the adversary is capable to
procure the same desktop 3D printer and drone, in order to
prepare and test attacks.
6.1.2. Experimental Environment. We have implemented
the scenario outlined above using equipment that is some-
what typical for a private household (see summary in Ta-
ble 1). The DJI Phantom 2 Vision+ is a 4 kg (8.8 pounds)
quadcopter UAV that can stay in the air for up to 25 minutes.
It has a HD video camera installed and can stream live video.
The drone can be purchased for about $500, a price that is
affordable for the majority of private users. For a 3D printer
we have selected the LulzBot Taz 5 with single extruder
and V2C connector. LuLzbot TAZ is a plug-and-play device
that comes with a numerous of features that can make it
DRONE& DJI&Phantom&2&Vision+&
3D&PRINTER& LuLzbot&Mini&TAZ&
FIRMWARE& Marlin&2015Q2&
CONTROLLER&PC& Intel&Xeon&CPU,&32GB&
RAM,&Windows&7&
SOFTWARE& !! SolidWorks&
!! Cura&19.12&
&TABLE 1. EXPERIMENTAL ENVIRONMENT, SUMMARY
attractive for a rather inexperienced user (e.g., auto-nozzle
cleaning). LuLzbot implements Fused Deposition Modeling
(FDM) technology which is characteristic for the bulk of the
desktop 3D printers that are currently available. It can be
purchased for about $1,250, placing it at the rather lower end
of the desktop 3D printers. The 3D printer operates using
Marlin firmware. Its counterpart, installed on the Controller
PC, is Cura. Both are widely used and are recommended
by several desktop 3D printer OEMs. The communication
between the Controller PC and the 3D printer is established
via a direct USB connection.
It should be noted that the LuLzbot 3D printer can oper-
ate using filaments of different materials as source materials.
For printing propellers, we have selected Acrylonitrile Bu-
tadiene Styrene (ABS). It is a very durable, strong, flexible,
shock absorbent, and heat resistant polymer – all properties
important for our scenario. The latter is especially important
to withstand the heat generated by the quadcopter’s motors.
While being out of scope of this paper, it should be noted
that this the manipulations or replacement of the source
material represents a physical attack that can sabotage the
manufactured part’s quality [11], [13]. We have performed
several laboratory experiments with propellers printed with
Polylactic acid (PLA), another thermoplastic that is fre-
quently used in 3D printing. During these experiments we
have observed that PLA’s relatively low melting point at
about (approximately 150-160 C) does not withstand the
heat that was generated by the Phantom’s motors.
6.2. Attack Chain Selection
While our discussion in Sections 4 and 5 was of more
general nature, in the current section we apply the devel-
oped concepts to identify an attack chain for the scenario
presented (the selection is indicated in Figure 8).
6.2.1. Attack Target. In this scenario, the goal is for the
propeller to break when the drone ascends very quickly or
after a comparatively short operational time. This means that
the sabotage of the propeller should either cause a reduction
in the propeller’s tensile strength in the direction of the lift
force, or cause the rapid development of material fatigue in
the propeller.
6.2.2. Manipulations. Out of the options described in Sec-
tions 4, the manipulation of the manufacturing process re-
quires a higher degree of the AM proficiency. As for our
Figure 8. Case study attack chain
scenario it is not the case, this option is eliminated. Both
possible influences on object specification are feasible with
the skills and tools our adversary has. This manipulation is
preferable in the examined scenario since it is both selective
and direct. However, a change to the orientation of the object
can eventually have the following drawbacks. First of all, if
the victim has already printed a propeller in the past (which
is our assumption) and monitors the printing process, change
of the printed object’s orientation can easily be recognized.
Furthermore, it is also possible that the object with changed
orientation will not fit in the 3D printer platform, thus
eventually preventing the propeller from being printed at all.
The remaining option of defect introduction is both feasible
and eventually can remain undetected.
While the selection of the manipulation category is
comparatively straight forward, the exact definition of the
modification is not. Questions such as what type of defect,
the shape of a defect, and its location in the printed 3D
object should be defined.
Even though the adversary has moderate AM profi-
ciency; it is extremely difficult to calculate impact of of
defect’s geometry on the stress concentration or similar
– factors intensively studied and well understood in the
material science. Therefore, the adversary has to experiment
with various defects and find which are working within
defined conditions.
Each defect can be introduced via multiple influenced
elements. The choice of the influenced elements depends
on the compromised element that is selected.
6.2.3. Compromised Element. The object description
changes its representation as it traversal over different el-
ements of workflow. It is represented as a STL/AMF file by
the 3D object designer and during transfer to the Controller
PC. Once at the Controller PC it is translated to either
G-code individual commands or a toolpath file that are
transmitted to the 3D printer. Also, in the 3D printer itself,
the design can have a different internal representation. It is
clear that any element along this path, if compromised, can
modify the object specification.
In our considered scenario we aim to compromise the
AM environment from the Internet, thus the Controller PC,
the element that is both used for AM and surfing the Internet,
is the valid choice.
6.2.4. Attack Vectors. Personal computers are a frequent
targets of attacks. Numerous tools and relevant information
can be found on the web. For choosing the attack vector,
we have focused on most common tools and behaviors of
individual users. We chose a phishing attack because it is
one of the most common attack vectors for individuals and
IT professionals. We had a choice of several file format or
flash exploits that are widely available on the Internet. We
chose a ZIP file format vulnerability in the popular WinRAR
software.
6.3. Defining Manipulation
Regardless of adversary’s AM proficiency, some impe-
rial experiments are required to verify that the manipulation
leads to the sabotage of the propeller. We assume that the ad-
versary has enough resources to perform some experiments,
using equipment either identical or close to identical to the
victim’s one. In particular, we assume that the adversary has
the same 3D printer and drone. By gaining access to victim’s
Controller PC, the adversary possesses the original design
file of the propeller and the knowledge of which slicing soft-
ware is used. Figure 9 shows the original propeller design. It
was modeled using the SolidWorks software. While playing
the role of an adversary who is modifying the design, we
use the SolidWorks software as well.
6.3.1. Location of Defect. Propellers convert engine’s
torque force into thrust force. The original propeller design
is engineered to withstand the thrust force that acts on it
when the motors are spinning at the maximum supported
revolution per minute (RPM). The lift force causes the pro-
peller to bent upwards during flight, thus placing a certain
amount of stress onto the propeller.
The calculation of thrust force and stress distribution are
rather complex topics12 that, as we assume, exceed by far
12. The thrust produced by a propeller depends on factors like its shape
and diameter, on the motor’s RPM, and on the density of the air. Stress
distribution depends on the object’s geometry and material properties.
Figure 9. Original Propeller Designed using SolidWorks
Figure 10. Red circles highlight location selected for the defect
the knowledge of an average adversary. Nevertheless, even
with a basic physics knowledge it is obvious that the biggest
force is applied at the joint connecting the blades and the
cap of the propeller together (see Figure 10). Therefore, this
joint appears to be a good location to insert a defect in the
design. Furthermore, if propeller breaks at this joint, the loss
of thrust will be the maximal compared to all other places
where a defect can be introduced.
6.3.2. Iteration through Manipulations. We have started
investigation of possible manipulations by physically
drilling holes between the blades and the cap after of a
propeller printed using unaltered design. Perhaps a counter
intuitive13 outcome was that it has not really affected the
propeller’s ability to operate at the motor’s maximum speed
without breaking.
In the next phase, we have modified the design file by
inserting internal rectangular gaps into the joint. We have
iterated with different sized of the gap verified their impact
13. While being counter intuitive, the outcome is based on the way how
geometrical properties affect stress concentration/distribution. Geometrical
discontinuities like cracks or sharp corners cause stress concentration;
round cavities might, in opposite, contribute to the stress distribution.
Figure 11. Propeller design with introduced defects
Figure 12. Two printed caps site-by-site. Cap A is sabotaged and Cap B
is benign
Figure 13. Two printed propellers site-by-site. The Upper is benign and the
lower is sabotaged
empirically (see Figure 11). We found that 0.1mm length
gaps to be optimal. Any gaps that were smaller did not in-
fluence the printing process enough to be meaningful. Larger
gaps caused the propeller to break within seconds of normal
activity. Moreover, we noticed that the introduction of gaps
also influences the printing pattern of the joint between the
cap and the blades. Figure 12 shows that the attachment
surface of the blade to the cap is facing outwards in a
normal design and inwards in a modified design. This mod-
ification to the attachment surface weakens its strength and
accelerates fatigue. In order to reinforce the joint between
the cap and the blades, we added internal support structure
inside the gaps that connects the blades to the cap. During
this iterative process, we have identified a modification that
yielded satisfactory results, i.e., the propeller broke after
operating for a period of time.
It should be noted that, because the effects we have intro-
duced are internal, the sabotage would remain unnoticed by
a simple visual inspection of the printed propeller. Figure 13
shows two propellers side-by-side. The propeller at the top
was printed using the original design, the propeller at the
bottom using our maliciously altered design.
6.3.3. Evaluation of Effects. For every altered design, we
have printed a propeller. We have evaluated the effects
of introduced defects empirically, in laboratory settings.
During all experiments we have always installed two 3D-
Figure 14. The damaged propeller just after it breaks in the lab
printed propellers, one of the original and another one of a
maliciously altered design.
In order to create a controlled, reproducible testing en-
vironment and to measure effects of our manipulations, we
have used an enclosed room and attached drone to the table
with a duct tape. We have rapidly increased thrust/RPM to
capture the breaking point. Doing this, we have measured
two factors: the breakage time of the propeller and the RPM
count when the failure happens.
During our tests we could verify that the propeller
printed using the original design could operate at more than
15000 RPM for an extended period of time (over 5 minutes).
However, propellers printed with various defects introduced
in the design could not sustain this operational conditions.
Figure 14 captures the second a sabotaged propeller breaks.
The breakage point occurred at 10457 RPM after ⇠10
seconds.
During our lab tests we have witnessed a side effect of
the targeted damage that we aimed to create. Besides com-
promising the drone itself, in some cases the breakage of the
propeller have damaged one of the other fully functioning
propellers.
7. Case Study, Part II: Attack Execution
After all the above described preparatory steps have been
accomplished, we were ready to perform the actual attack.
7.1. Sabotage Attack
We execute the sabotage attack in three steps. First, we
have compromised the victim’s Controller PC. Second, we
have downloaded the original design file and developed a
sabotaged design (as described in Section 6.3). Third, we
have changed the design file on the victim’s PC according
to the developed manipulation.
Figure 15. The drone with three normal propellers and one damaged
7.1.1. Compromising Controller PC. In order to infiltrate
the system, we used a patched WinRAR vulnerability [35]
that spoofs the file name and extension of the archived
document. We have created a malicious EXE file using
the Metasploit framework that triggers an exploit. Using
the WinRAR vulnerability, we have changed the name and
extension of the executable file to look like an innocent PDF
file.
The victim received an email enticing him to download
a .Zip file from Dropbox and double-click on the PDF file
inside. Once the victim clicks on the file, a reverse shell is
opened in the background and the attacker can take control
over the system.
7.1.2. Manipulating Design File. The next step is to find
potential design files that the attacker can manipulate. The
attacker searches for .STL files and downloads them for
further investigation. Once the files are in the attacker’s
possession he/she can modify the design in a way that would
cause damage. In our experiment, we have modified the
design using the SolidWork software, tested the effect of
the manipulation experimentally (Section 6.3), and lastly,
replaced the original file with the maliciously altered one.
After the modified file is used to produce a replacement
propeller, the sabotage attack enters a new phase, when the
entire CPS can become a victim of a part failure.
7.2. Field Trials
The first step of the field trials was to test whether the
printed propellers will be able to withstand actual flight. We
attached four propeller that were all printed from the regular
design. The drone was able to take off and fly normally
during a long periods of time (more than 5 minutes of
regular flight).
Figure 16. Drone in flight with the damaged propeller
Figure 17. The damaged propeller breaks mid-flight
Then, to complete the attack, we have replaced a sin-
gle propeller with a sabotaged 3D printed one. Figure 15
shows a drone with four 3D printed propellers attached. All
propellers were printed from the original design file except
one that was printed from the modified design file. During
the final stress test, the propeller withstood a flight test of 1
min and 43 seconds (Figure 16). During this time, the drone
was first ordered to accelerate from low to high altitude in
short period of time. Then it has performed three cycles of
low to high altitude changes. During these initial cycles, the
sabotaged propeller performed normally. However, during
the fourth iteration of rapid ascension the propeller broke
apart.
When the propeller blades broke apart during the flight
(see Figure 17), the drone was at the peak of its up-
ward acceleration. Consequently, the quadcopter fell from
a considerable height and shattered. The drone was severely
damaged from that fall. The damage included one of the
motors and the camera being completely destroyed, and
the external casing of the drone cracked. We demonstrated
how minor modification in the object’s specification that
were remotely introduced into the AM environment, caused
the complete destruction of a cyber-physical system (see
Figure 18).
Figure 18. The broken sabotaged propeller
8. Conclusion
Additive Manufacturing (AM) emerges as a transforma-
tive manufacturing technology that is increasingly used for
production of functional parts, including those for safety-
critical systems. Due to the computerization of AM, several
researchers have raised concern of its possible sabotage [9],
[10], [11], [12], [13], [14]. Researchers have discussed
attack vectors [12], [16], analyzed which AM manufacturing
parameters can sabotage a part’s quality [11], [29], shown
experimentally that introduction of defects can degrade a
part’s mechanical properties [9], [14], and even speculated
about possibility of weaponizing the AM process [13].
While being important contributions, prior works covers
selected aspects of a possible attack only. To our best
knowledge, this paper presents the very first full chain of
attack involving AM, beginning with a cyber attack to com-
promise AM equipment, through a malicious modification
of a design file, leading to the manufactured functional
part’s sabotage, and resulting in the physical destruction of a
cyber-physical system that employs this part. For doing this,
we have proposed a systematic approach to identify options
for an attack involving AM that will allow an adversary to
achieve his/her goals. Then we introduced a methodology
for the assessment of the attack difficulty, thus enabling
differentiation between possible attack chains. While this
assessment is provided from the adversary perspective, it
also allows a defender to reason about the most likely
attacks. Finally, we applied the proposed approach on a se-
lected scenario of a desktop 3D printer used to manufacture
propellers of a quadcopter UAV. We show experimentally
the proof for the whole attack chain. The video of the
quadcopter’s final flight when the sabotaged propeller broke
can be found under [34].
Even though our experimental verification has compro-
mised a private person’s desktop 3D printer, we argue that
similar attacks are possible on industrial systems producing
metal parts for safety-critical systems. Therefore, in order to
protect public safety and national security, solutions should
be found and implemented that will increase both robustness
and resilience of AM to sabotage attacks.
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